Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules
We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreove...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:288670 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288670 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Single-peakedness Strategy-proofness Anonymity Unanimity Tops-onlyness |
| Resumo: | We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences. |
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