On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:308228 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308228 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Multi-dimensional single-peakedness Strategy-proofness |
| Resumo: | We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist. |
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