Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups t...
| Authors: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2007 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:143788 |
| Online Access: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143788 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Economia matemàtica Bribe-proofness Strategy-proofness Pareto efficiency Replacement monotonicity Single-peakedness |
| Summary: | The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997). |
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