Benatarian antinatalism and Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism
This article aims to analyze how the concept of antinatalism – that is, a philosophical view that argues it is better for humans to stop bringing new lives into the world, or that it would have been better if we had not been brought into existence – and, more specifically, David Benatar's antin...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
| Repositorio: | Voluntas - Revista Internacional de Filosofia (Santa Maria) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/88376 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/88376 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Antinatalismo Benatar Metafísica Schopenhauer Antinatalism Metaphysics |
| Resumo: | This article aims to analyze how the concept of antinatalism – that is, a philosophical view that argues it is better for humans to stop bringing new lives into the world, or that it would have been better if we had not been brought into existence – and, more specifically, David Benatar's antinatalism, align with the metaphysical branch of Schopenhauerian pessimism, present in Volume I of The World as Will and Representation and also in the Supplements. In doing so, this work does not intend to presuppose that Schopenhauer's branches of pessimism are necessarily antinatalist. Rather, the motivation is to demonstrate what aspects of Schopenhauerian metaphysical pessimism are present in Benatar's antinatalism, which, being different from other antinatalist views, is described here as "benatarian" and consequently, what in the South African philosopher's position can be justified by Schopenhauer's metaphysics. |
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