Sobre o verificacionismo e restrições ao princípio do terceiro excluído
Here I show how to relate Middle Wittgenstein’s problem with the expression of conceptual relations among colors to some problems to his verificationist remarks. Some problems concerning the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM) are also discussed in the context of Satzsysteme and verificationism in th...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/244723 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/244723 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | verificationism expressivism inferentialism contradiction contrariety middle Wittgenstein verificacionismo expressivismo inferencialismo contradição contrariedade Wittgenstein intermediário |
| Sumario: | Here I show how to relate Middle Wittgenstein’s problem with the expression of conceptual relations among colors to some problems to his verificationist remarks. Some problems concerning the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM) are also discussed in the context of Satzsysteme and verificationism in the the discussions with the Vienna Circle. For that, this work investigates the so-called color exclusion problem and its impact on the Tractarian notational means, however, showing that truth-table notation can express relations of contrariety, subcontrary and contradictoriness through systematic mutilations of its lines. I also examine how and why (PEM) seems to be not valid among phenomenological systems. |
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