On the intentional element in Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Observations”: theoretical foundations

The purpose of this work is to analyze Wittgenstein's concept of intentional-ity, developed in the text of the Philosophical Remarks, to clarify the imme-diate context of its emergence and to find its relations with the philosophyof the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Such concept appears expli...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Mello, Marcio Rodrigo
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:Brasil
Recursos:Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)
Repositorio:Perspectiva Filosófica (Online)
Idioma:portugués
OAI Identifier:oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/246531
Acesso em linha:https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/246531
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Intentionality
Verificationism
Middle Wittgenstein
Filosofia da linguagem
filosofia da mente
intencionalidade
verificacionismo
Wittgenstein intermediário
Descrição
Resumo:The purpose of this work is to analyze Wittgenstein's concept of intentional-ity, developed in the text of the Philosophical Remarks, to clarify the imme-diate context of its emergence and to find its relations with the philosophyof the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Such concept appears explicitly forits first time in the context of the author's debate with Russell, in whichWittgenstein criticizes the  author’s view present in the work TheAnalysisof Mind, when saying that the conception of the relation between thoughtand fact developed in this work depends on an external relation, while hisown picture conception depends only on an internal relation. The roots ofthis statement are found in the Tractatus, in which he fully develops hisconcept of "internal relations". It is the aim of this paper to analyze the needfor this “element of intention” and its foundations in the Tractatus, in the context of the debate with Russell and the development of Wittgenstein'sthought in the intermediate period of his philosophy.