Capital structure under collusion

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stabl...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Ferrés, Daniel, Ormazabal, Gaizka, Povel, Paul, Sertsios, Giorgio
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:Uruguay
Institución:Universidad de Montevideo
Repositorio:REDUM
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1394
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Capital structure
Financial leverage
Collusion
Cartels
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Capital structure under collusion
title Capital structure under collusion
spellingShingle Capital structure under collusion
Ferrés, Daniel
Capital structure
Financial leverage
Collusion
Cartels
title_short Capital structure under collusion
title_full Capital structure under collusion
title_fullStr Capital structure under collusion
title_full_unstemmed Capital structure under collusion
title_sort Capital structure under collusion
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ferrés, Daniel
Ormazabal, Gaizka
Povel, Paul
Sertsios, Giorgio
author Ferrés, Daniel
author_facet Ferrés, Daniel
Ormazabal, Gaizka
Povel, Paul
Sertsios, Giorgio
author_role author
author2 Ormazabal, Gaizka
Povel, Paul
Sertsios, Giorgio
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay
dc.subject.keyword.es.fl_str_mv Capital structure
Financial leverage
Collusion
Cartels
topic Capital structure
Financial leverage
Collusion
Cartels
description We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv 2021
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z
dc.type.es.fl_str_mv Artículo
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dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv Aceptada
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dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv 1096-0473
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394
dc.identifier.doi.es.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854
identifier_str_mv 1096-0473
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854
dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv Abierto
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
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dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:REDUM
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