Price Transparency and Tacit Collusion in the Gasoline Industry in Mexico
Despite the introduction of new retailers in the Mexican gasoline industry in 2018, retail margins remain high regardless of the low international oil prices. This article introduces a theoretical model in which price transparency reinforces tacit collusion among retailers rather than favoring a com...
| Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2020 |
| Country: | México |
| Institution: | Universidad Panamericana |
| Repository: | Redalyc-UP |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:41365966010 |
| Online Access: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41365966010 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/413/41365966010/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/413/41365966010/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/413/41365966010/41365966010.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/413/41365966010/movil |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Economía y Finanzas L13 L40 Cartels Transparency Tacit Collusion |
| Summary: | Despite the introduction of new retailers in the Mexican gasoline industry in 2018, retail margins remain high regardless of the low international oil prices. This article introduces a theoretical model in which price transparency reinforces tacit collusion among retailers rather than favoring a competitive environment. Counterintuitively, the government should strive to implement price Obfuscation rather than Transparency, in order to promote socially beneficial price wars. |
|---|