Collusion-proof and fair auctions

In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Hagen, Martin
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:CUNEF Universidad
Repositorio:OpenCUNEF
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/35
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:mechanism design
social choice theory
auctions
group strategyproofness
symmetry
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spelling Collusion-proof and fair auctionsHagen, Martinmechanism designsocial choice theoryauctionsgroup strategyproofnesssymmetryIn the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).20192019-12-0120192019-12-01journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35reponame:OpenCUNEFinstname:CUNEF UniversidadInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/352026-06-17T11:50:27Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collusion-proof and fair auctions
title Collusion-proof and fair auctions
spellingShingle Collusion-proof and fair auctions
Hagen, Martin
mechanism design
social choice theory
auctions
group strategyproofness
symmetry
title_short Collusion-proof and fair auctions
title_full Collusion-proof and fair auctions
title_fullStr Collusion-proof and fair auctions
title_full_unstemmed Collusion-proof and fair auctions
title_sort Collusion-proof and fair auctions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hagen, Martin
author Hagen, Martin
author_facet Hagen, Martin
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv mechanism design
social choice theory
auctions
group strategyproofness
symmetry
topic mechanism design
social choice theory
auctions
group strategyproofness
symmetry
description In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2019-12-01
2019
2019-12-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:OpenCUNEF
instname:CUNEF Universidad
instname_str CUNEF Universidad
reponame_str OpenCUNEF
collection OpenCUNEF
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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