Collusion-proof and fair auctions
In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).
| Autor: | |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repositorio: | OpenCUNEF |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/35 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/35 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | mechanism design social choice theory auctions group strategyproofness symmetry |
| Sumario: | In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval). |
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