Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections

We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compar...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo, Dimitrov, Dinko
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Recursos:Universidad Pública de Navarra
Repositorio:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
OAI Identifier:oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/39334
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Agenda
Binary tree
Elections
Manipulation
Sequential voting
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spelling Manipulative agendas in four-candidate electionsArlegi Pérez, RicardoDimitrov, DinkoAgendaBinary treeElectionsManipulationSequential votingWe consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.ElsevierEkonomiaInstitute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEEconomía2020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarrainstname:Universidad Pública de NavarraInglés© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/393342026-06-17T12:41:47Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
title Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
spellingShingle Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo
Agenda
Binary tree
Elections
Manipulation
Sequential voting
title_short Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
title_full Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
title_fullStr Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
title_full_unstemmed Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
title_sort Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo
Dimitrov, Dinko
author Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo
author_facet Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo
Dimitrov, Dinko
author_role author
author2 Dimitrov, Dinko
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Ekonomia
Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
Economía
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Agenda
Binary tree
Elections
Manipulation
Sequential voting
topic Agenda
Binary tree
Elections
Manipulation
Sequential voting
description We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334
url https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname:Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname_str Universidad Pública de Navarra
reponame_str Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
collection Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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