Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compar...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/39334 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting |
| Resumo: | We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative. |
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