Collusion with costly consumer search

I use standard consumer search models to study how an increase in market transparency (lower search costs or higher share of fully informed consumers) affects cartel stability. When firms sell horizontally differentiated products, cartels become more stable as the search cost increases; with homogen...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Petrikaité, Vaiva
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Recursos:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/133473
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/133473
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Collusion
Sequential search
Homogeneous products
Horizontal differentiation
Search costs
Cartel
id ES_c6f3489772b8fc89023c7b789fffeb41
oai_identifier_str oai:digital.csic.es:10261/133473
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Collusion with costly consumer searchPetrikaité, VaivaCollusionSequential searchHomogeneous productsHorizontal differentiationSearch costsCartelI use standard consumer search models to study how an increase in market transparency (lower search costs or higher share of fully informed consumers) affects cartel stability. When firms sell horizontally differentiated products, cartels become more stable as the search cost increases; with homogeneous products, by contrast, the opposite holds. A higher share of fully informed consumers makes collusion less stable when the market is initially sufficiently transparent, whereas it happens otherwise if the market is originally little transparent.Financial support from the Marie Curie Excellence Grant MEXT-CT-2006-042471 is gratefully acknowledgedPeer ReviewedElsevierEuropean CommissionConsejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]2016201620162016info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://hdl.handle.net/10261/133473reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.006Síinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1334732026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collusion with costly consumer search
title Collusion with costly consumer search
spellingShingle Collusion with costly consumer search
Petrikaité, Vaiva
Collusion
Sequential search
Homogeneous products
Horizontal differentiation
Search costs
Cartel
title_short Collusion with costly consumer search
title_full Collusion with costly consumer search
title_fullStr Collusion with costly consumer search
title_full_unstemmed Collusion with costly consumer search
title_sort Collusion with costly consumer search
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Petrikaité, Vaiva
author Petrikaité, Vaiva
author_facet Petrikaité, Vaiva
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv European Commission
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Collusion
Sequential search
Homogeneous products
Horizontal differentiation
Search costs
Cartel
topic Collusion
Sequential search
Homogeneous products
Horizontal differentiation
Search costs
Cartel
description I use standard consumer search models to study how an increase in market transparency (lower search costs or higher share of fully informed consumers) affects cartel stability. When firms sell horizontally differentiated products, cartels become more stable as the search cost increases; with homogeneous products, by contrast, the opposite holds. A higher share of fully informed consumers makes collusion less stable when the market is initially sufficiently transparent, whereas it happens otherwise if the market is originally little transparent.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2016
2016
2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/133473
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/133473
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.006
Sí
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869419115855216640
score 15,812455

Registos relacionados