Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions
In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf-Owen coalitional value.
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC) |
| Repositorio: | Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:minerva.usc.gal:10347/38704 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38704 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Cooperative game Shapley value A priori unions Coalitional value |
| Sumario: | In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf-Owen coalitional value. |
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