The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The...
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC) |
| Repositorio: | Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:minerva.usc.gal:10347/38705 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10347/38705 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Cooperative game Shapley value Banzhaf value Coalition structure Coalitional value Balanced contributions |
| Resumo: | In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency. |
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