Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing ag...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Decarolis, Francesco, Goldmanis, Maris, Penta, Antonio
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/45339
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45339
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Collusion
Digital marketing agencies
Facebook
Google
Internet auctions
Online advertising
GSP
VCG
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spelling Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctionsDecarolis, FrancescoGoldmanis, MarisPenta, AntonioCollusionDigital marketing agenciesFacebookGoogleInternet auctionsOnline advertisingGSPVCGThe transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency.A. Penta acknowledgesfinancial support from the European Research Council Starting Grant[Grant 759424].INFORMS202020202020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/45339http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésManagement science. 2020:66(10):4433–54.info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/759424© 2020 INFORMSinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/453392026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
title Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
spellingShingle Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
Decarolis, Francesco
Collusion
Digital marketing agencies
Facebook
Google
Internet auctions
Online advertising
GSP
VCG
title_short Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
title_full Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
title_fullStr Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
title_full_unstemmed Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
title_sort Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Decarolis, Francesco
Goldmanis, Maris
Penta, Antonio
author Decarolis, Francesco
author_facet Decarolis, Francesco
Goldmanis, Maris
Penta, Antonio
author_role author
author2 Goldmanis, Maris
Penta, Antonio
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Collusion
Digital marketing agencies
Facebook
Google
Internet auctions
Online advertising
GSP
VCG
topic Collusion
Digital marketing agencies
Facebook
Google
Internet auctions
Online advertising
GSP
VCG
description The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
2020
2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45339
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45339
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Management science. 2020:66(10):4433–54.
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/759424
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © 2020 INFORMS
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © 2020 INFORMS
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv INFORMS
publisher.none.fl_str_mv INFORMS
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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