Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction

The Spanish Treasury is the only one in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell bonds. In the Spanish auction, winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower than tbe weighted average price of witming bids, while all other winning bidders pay the...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Álvarez González, Francisco, Mazón Calpena, Cristina
Formato: informe técnico
Fecha de publicación:1999
País:España
Recursos:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/64227
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64227
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Treasury auctions
Spanish auction
Multi-unit auctions
Simulations.
Comercio
Hacienda Pública
5304.03 Comercio exterior
5301 Política Fiscal y Hacienda Publica Nacionales
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oai_identifier_str oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/64227
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auctionÁlvarez González, FranciscoMazón Calpena, CristinaTreasury auctionsSpanish auctionMulti-unit auctionsSimulations.ComercioHacienda Pública5304.03 Comercio exterior5301 Política Fiscal y Hacienda Publica NacionalesThe Spanish Treasury is the only one in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell bonds. In the Spanish auction, winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower than tbe weighted average price of witming bids, while all other winning bidders pay the weighted average price of winning bids. We adapt Gordy's (96) medel of the discriminatory auction to the Spanish auction. The model is a discrete model of multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction. We use numerical simulations to find equilibria for the Spanish, the uniform and the discriminatory auction. Our results show that bidders in the Spanish and discriminatory auctions use bid spread to cover themselves against uncertainty, and that expected seller's revenue is larger on average in the former.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)Universidad Complutense de Madrid19991999-01-0119991999-01-01technical reporthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ghinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64227reponame:Docta Complutenseinstname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)Inglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Españahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/642272026-06-02T12:44:21Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
title Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
spellingShingle Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
Álvarez González, Francisco
Treasury auctions
Spanish auction
Multi-unit auctions
Simulations.
Comercio
Hacienda Pública
5304.03 Comercio exterior
5301 Política Fiscal y Hacienda Publica Nacionales
title_short Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
title_full Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
title_fullStr Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
title_full_unstemmed Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
title_sort Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Álvarez González, Francisco
Mazón Calpena, Cristina
author Álvarez González, Francisco
author_facet Álvarez González, Francisco
Mazón Calpena, Cristina
author_role author
author2 Mazón Calpena, Cristina
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Complutense de Madrid
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Treasury auctions
Spanish auction
Multi-unit auctions
Simulations.
Comercio
Hacienda Pública
5304.03 Comercio exterior
5301 Política Fiscal y Hacienda Publica Nacionales
topic Treasury auctions
Spanish auction
Multi-unit auctions
Simulations.
Comercio
Hacienda Pública
5304.03 Comercio exterior
5301 Política Fiscal y Hacienda Publica Nacionales
description The Spanish Treasury is the only one in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell bonds. In the Spanish auction, winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower than tbe weighted average price of witming bids, while all other winning bidders pay the weighted average price of winning bids. We adapt Gordy's (96) medel of the discriminatory auction to the Spanish auction. The model is a discrete model of multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction. We use numerical simulations to find equilibria for the Spanish, the uniform and the discriminatory auction. Our results show that bidders in the Spanish and discriminatory auctions use bid spread to cover themselves against uncertainty, and that expected seller's revenue is larger on average in the former.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999
1999-01-01
1999
1999-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv technical report
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/report
format report
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64227
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64227
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Docta Complutense
instname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
instname_str Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
reponame_str Docta Complutense
collection Docta Complutense
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869412113785552896
score 15,812455

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