Price volatility in the secondary market and bidders’ heterogeneous behavior in Spanish Treasury auctions

We use multi-unit multi-bid common value auction models with private information to draw empirical implications on how bidding behavior in bond auctions is affected by secondary market price volatility, implications that we test using individual bidding data for 88 bond auctions held between 2003 an...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Álvarez González, Francisco, Mazón Calpena, Cristina
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Recursos:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/23615
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23615
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:C13
D44
G28
Multi-unit auctions
Bidding behavior
Treasury auctions
Spanish format
Intra-auction heterogeneity.
Econometría (Economía)
Finanzas
5302 Econometría
Descrição
Resumo:We use multi-unit multi-bid common value auction models with private information to draw empirical implications on how bidding behavior in bond auctions is affected by secondary market price volatility, implications that we test using individual bidding data for 88 bond auctions held between 2003 and 2007 by the Spanish Treasury. The main novelty of the paper is that we analyze the effect of volatility in bidders heterogeneous behavior within an auction. We provide evidence that, as the theoretical models predict, the heterogeneity of bidders’ bid shading increases with volatility and that, on average across auctions, bid shading and bidders’ profit also increase with volatility.