Firefighting as a Game
The Firefighter Problem was proposed in 1995 [16] as a deterministic discrete-time model for the spread (and containment) of a fire. Its applications reach from real fires to the spreading of deseases and the containment of floods. Furthermore, it can be used to model the spread of computer viruses...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/99479 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/99479 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Firefighter problem Spreading models for networks Algorithmic game theory Nash equilibria Price of anarchy Coalitions Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Informàtica teòrica |
| Resumo: | The Firefighter Problem was proposed in 1995 [16] as a deterministic discrete-time model for the spread (and containment) of a fire. Its applications reach from real fires to the spreading of deseases and the containment of floods. Furthermore, it can be used to model the spread of computer viruses or viral marketing in communication networks. In this work, we study the problem from a game-theorical perspective. Such a context seems very appropriate when applied to large networks, where entities may act and make decisions based on their own interests, without global coordination. We model the Firefighter Problem as a strategic game where there is one player for each time step who decides where to place the firefighters. We show that the Price of Anarchy is linear in the general case, but at most 2 for trees. We prove that the quality of the equilibria improves when allowing coalitional cooperation among players. In general, we have that the Price of Anarchy is in O( n / k ) where k is the coalition size. Furthermore, we show that there are topologies which have a constant Price of Anarchy even when constant sized coalitions are considered. |
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