Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derive...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Manzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744f, Vives, X. (Xavier)|||/items/80d98ca7-131a-4926-90ea-44f512d511f5
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/62961
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Demand/supply schedule competition
Private information
Liquidity auctions
Treasury auctions
Electricity auctions
Market integration
id ES_48d43b979031908cfc65d5cb86d7503b
oai_identifier_str oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/62961
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctionsManzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744fVives, X. (Xavier)|||/items/80d98ca7-131a-4926-90ea-44f512d511f5Demand/supply schedule competitionPrivate informationLiquidity auctionsTreasury auctionsElectricity auctionsMarket integrationWe analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.Econometric SocietyDadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra20222022-02-2520212021-07-2620212021-07-26journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarrainstname:Universidad de NavarraInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/629612026-06-21T12:47:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
title Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
spellingShingle Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
Manzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744f
Demand/supply schedule competition
Private information
Liquidity auctions
Treasury auctions
Electricity auctions
Market integration
title_short Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
title_full Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
title_fullStr Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
title_full_unstemmed Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
title_sort Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Manzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744f
Vives, X. (Xavier)|||/items/80d98ca7-131a-4926-90ea-44f512d511f5
author Manzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744f
author_facet Manzano, C. (Carolina)|||/items/8d11969d-76d4-4128-9c94-077b0dac744f
Vives, X. (Xavier)|||/items/80d98ca7-131a-4926-90ea-44f512d511f5
author_role author
author2 Vives, X. (Xavier)|||/items/80d98ca7-131a-4926-90ea-44f512d511f5
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Demand/supply schedule competition
Private information
Liquidity auctions
Treasury auctions
Electricity auctions
Market integration
topic Demand/supply schedule competition
Private information
Liquidity auctions
Treasury auctions
Electricity auctions
Market integration
description We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021-07-26
2021
2021-07-26
2022
2022-02-25
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961
url https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Econometric Society
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Econometric Society
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
instname:Universidad de Navarra
instname_str Universidad de Navarra
reponame_str Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
collection Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869407384526389248
score 15.301603

Similares en LA Referencia