Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the shapley value of the broadcasting game
We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. W...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Pablo de Olavide (UPO) |
| Repositorio: | RIO. Repositorio Institucional Olavide |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:rio.upo.es:10433/22187 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22187 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Broadcasting rights Cooperative games Core Shapley value Axioms |
| Resumo: | We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection. |
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