From Neopositivist Inductivism to Popperian Critical Rationalism: A Discussion on Demarcation Criteria in Scientific Epistemology
This paper aims to present a brief discussion of the debate between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and the critical rationalism of Karl Popper. After a general discussion of the theoretical perspective of the Viennese intellectuals, the aim is to demonstrate how the philosopher Karl Pop...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositório: | Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea |
| Idioma: | português |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/28435 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/28435 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Empirismo Lógico. Karl Popper. Epistemologia. Critério de Demarcação. Logical Empiricism. Karl Popper. Epistemology. Demarcation Criteria |
| Resumo: | This paper aims to present a brief discussion of the debate between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and the critical rationalism of Karl Popper. After a general discussion of the theoretical perspective of the Viennese intellectuals, the aim is to demonstrate how the philosopher Karl Popper tries to overcome the principle of verification of the logical empiricists by means of the principle of falsifiability. In analyzing Popper's critiques in more detail, we try to address some theoretical questions about the difficulties of supplanting the criterion of Popperian scientific demarcation in relation to the neopositivist, especially regarding the use of the inductive method. Â |
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