Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands
We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the compl...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1999 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/12344 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/12344 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Competitive price Nash equilibrium Mechanism Optimal matching Economia Economia matemática Modelos econométricos |
| Resumo: | We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised. |
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