On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate an...
| Authors: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2017 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:171311 |
| Online Access: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171311 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Matching Competitive equilibrium Optimal competitive equilibrium Manipulability Competitive equilibrium rule |
| Summary: | We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem. |
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