The strategic logic of nuclear proliferation. A theoretical approach
Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear proliferation has remained a polarizing issue. While some attribute to it a pacifying effect, others, adopting a more pessimistic stance, underscore its catastrophic potential. This article aims to shed light on the study of the strategic...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Perú |
| Recursos: | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú |
| Repositorio: | Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/29029 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/agendainternacional/article/view/29029 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Nuclear proliferation Strategy Game theory Disarmament International security Proliferación nuclear Estrategia Teoría de juegos Desarme Seguridad internacional |
| Resumo: | Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear proliferation has remained a polarizing issue. While some attribute to it a pacifying effect, others, adopting a more pessimistic stance, underscore its catastrophic potential. This article aims to shed light on the study of the strategic dynamics surrounding this phenomenon by categorizing its key components and exploring the main motivations that push states to obtain nuclear weapons. Since we argue that a state’s likelihood of proliferation is largely determined by the strategic interaction with its adversaries, we employ Game Theory’s models, specifically the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and the “Deer Hunt”, to discuss the tendencies that may lead towards either a scenario of widespread proliferation or one of coordinated denuclearization. |
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