Simultaneous auctions of identical items by first-price close mechanism with a bonus for buyers
Objective: In this paper we study, from the seller’s perspective, how to auction a finite set of identical items when the buyer who obtains the whole set of goods (if any) gets a bonus, such that the seller maximizes his expected revenue and taking into account the strategic behavior of the bidders....
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD DE GUADALAJARA |
| Repositorio: | EconoQuantum |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:econoquantum.cucea.udg.mx:article/7270 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://econoquantum.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/EQ/article/view/7270 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | subastas simultáneas mecanismo del primer precio juegos bayesianos equilibrio bayesiano simétrico rendimiento esperado del vendedor simultaneous auctions first-price sealed mechanism bayesian games symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium seller's expected revenue |
| Sumario: | Objective: In this paper we study, from the seller’s perspective, how to auction a finite set of identical items when the buyer who obtains the whole set of goods (if any) gets a bonus, such that the seller maximizes his expected revenue and taking into account the strategic behavior of the bidders. Methodology: We use Bayesian Games for modelling the situation considering a strategy space equal to R+m for each bidder. Results: We show a Symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium for the model as well as the seller’s indifference between several natural ways for offering the bonus to a bidder getting the whole set of items, because he obtains the same expected revenue. Limitations: The model regards only identical items. Originality: We show an equilibrium bid for a n-personal model of m Simultaneous Auctions under first-price close mechanism considering that there is a kind of extra profit. Conclusions: The seller is indifferent between several ways to offer the bonus. It could be interesting to contrast the theoretical results under an experimental framework. |
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