Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems
An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting system...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/91241 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/91241 https://dx.doi.org/10.5277/ord160203 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Game theory Decision making -- Mathematical models Voting -- Mathematical models Dimension Egalitarianism Decisiveness Voting systems Simple games Weighted majority games Shapley–Shubik power index Jocs, Teoria de Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics Vot -- Models matemàtics Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs |
| Resumo: | An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared. |
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