An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their p...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2017 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/199460 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| Summary: | Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. |
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