Repeated Contests with Commitment
Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimi...
| Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repository: | OpenCUNEF |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/15 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/15 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Repeated all-pay auction Contests Private information |
| Summary: | Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimidates rivals in future contests. In equilibrium, several structural differences emerge between periods in which multiple contestants maintain an all-in look, as opposed to one: most prominently, only in the former case aggregate efforts may exceed the per-period prize, and only in the latter payoffs can be positive. |
|---|