The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This a...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositório: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/217260 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217260 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Justificació (Teoria del coneixement) Negació (Lògica) Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació) Justification (Theory of Knowledge) Negation (Logic) Knowledge representation (Information theory) |
| Resumo: | According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true. |
|---|