Wage cyclicality and labour market institutions

Do labor institutions influence how wages respond to the business cycle? Such responsiveness can then shape several economic outcomes, including unemployment. In this paper, we examine the role of two key labor market institutions—collective bargaining and temporary contracts—upon wage cyclicality....

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Pereira, João, Ramos Lobo, Raúl, Martins, Pedro S.
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Data de publicação:2025
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositório:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/222927
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222927
Access Level:Acesso embargado
Palavra-chave:Institucions
Política salarial
Mercat de treball
Institutions
Wage policy
Labor market
Descrição
Resumo:Do labor institutions influence how wages respond to the business cycle? Such responsiveness can then shape several economic outcomes, including unemployment. In this paper, we examine the role of two key labor market institutions—collective bargaining and temporary contracts—upon wage cyclicality. Our evidence is drawn from rich, 2002–2020 matched data from Portugal. We find that workers not covered by collective agreements exhibit much higher wage cyclicality, especially new hires, compared to covered workers. In contrast, workers under temporary contracts do not exhibit sizable differences in cyclicality compared to counterparts under permanent (open-ended) contracts. Our findings highlight a novel angle through which labor institutions influence the labor market and the economy