On alpha-roughly weighted games
Very recently Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) h ave introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of weighted voting games or roughly weighted voting games. Their third class C aconsists of all simple games permitting a w...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de documento: | relatório científico |
| Data de publicação: | 2011 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositório: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/103235 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/103235 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Game theory Voting--Mathematical models Simple game Weighted majority game Complete simple game Roughly weighted game Voting theory Hierarchy Jocs, Teoria de Vot -- Models matemàtics Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91C Social and behavioral sciences: general topics Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs |
| Resumo: | Very recently Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) h ave introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of weighted voting games or roughly weighted voting games. Their third class C aconsists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winnin g coalition has a weight of at least 1 and each losing coalition a weight of at most a. We continue their work and contribute some new results on the possible values of a for a given number of voters. |
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