Minimalism, Supervaluations and Fixed Points
In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which insta...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/152384 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/152384 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Veritat i mentida Paradoxa Truthfulness and falsehood Paradox Horwich, Paul |
| Resumo: | In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some formal versions of Horwich's construction. |
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