Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability
The philosophical debate concerning free will and determinism has continued unresolved for millennia, the outcome of which allegedly carries critical implications for whether and how people are held responsible for their actions. The law generally presumes the existence of some manner of free will a...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/687734 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/687734 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Determinism Determinismo Neuropsicología Neuropsychology Free will Libre albedrío 34 |
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Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| title |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| spellingShingle |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability Hinchliffe, Alexander James Collins Determinism Determinismo Neuropsicología Neuropsychology Free will Libre albedrío 34 |
| title_short |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| title_full |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| title_fullStr |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| title_sort |
Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Hinchliffe, Alexander James Collins |
| author |
Hinchliffe, Alexander James Collins |
| author_facet |
Hinchliffe, Alexander James Collins |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Moreso, Josep Joan Nagel, Rosemarie Coca Vila, Ivó Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament de Dret |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Determinism Determinismo Neuropsicología Neuropsychology Free will Libre albedrío 34 |
| topic |
Determinism Determinismo Neuropsicología Neuropsychology Free will Libre albedrío 34 |
| description |
The philosophical debate concerning free will and determinism has continued unresolved for millennia, the outcome of which allegedly carries critical implications for whether and how people are held responsible for their actions. The law generally presumes the existence of some manner of free will and constructs the concept of responsibility on top of these foundations. Without entering directly into the philosophical debate, the present thesis adopts the opposing presumption that metaphysical free will is precluded by causal determinism and therefore does not exist. From this starting position, the question asked is how can people rationally be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe absent of metaphysically free decision-making? Part One of the thesis reviews an extensive body of empirical and theoretical research concerning decision-making in the human brain from the joint studies of neuroscience and psychology. The reasoning for this is twofold; on the one hand, and in very general terms, neuropsychology is broadly premised on the same presumptions of causal determinism which underpin the natural sciences – i.e., the physics of the macroscopic universe, chemistry, biology, and the biochemistry governing biological organisms. On the other hand, every action which results in criminal liability begins with a decision to act in the brain, whether occurring consciously or unconsciously. Part Two of the thesis subsequently takes conclusions and implications from the neuropsychology of decision-making and applies them to a critique of the legal concept of responsibility, focusing on the aspect of mens rea in particular. The thesis proposes replacing proof of subjective states of mind with proof of certain mental capacities that are necessary for responsibility – the capacities to exercise ordinary self-control, to recognise and respond to reason, and to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions. This approach is tested against leading jurisprudence to demonstrate its efficacy as a practical means of ascribing legal responsibility for criminal actions. Further implications are presented, such as replacing the notion of moral blame with that of unreasonable conduct as the theoretical underpinning to criminal liability, and denying any role for retributive theories of punishment. Finally, this capacity-based theory of responsibility is reintroduced into the wider philosophical debate between free will and determinism. Here, it is demonstrated how the theory provides a rational approach to holding people responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe and without any presumptions of, or reliance upon, metaphysical free will. |
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2023 |
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2023 2023 2023 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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doctoralThesis |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10803/687734 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10803/687734 |
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Inglés |
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Inglés |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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openAccess |
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818 p. application/pdf |
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
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TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa) reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red instname:CBUC, CESCA |
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CBUC, CESCA |
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TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
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TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
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1869415544676941824 |
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Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liabilityHinchliffe, Alexander James CollinsDeterminismDeterminismoNeuropsicologíaNeuropsychologyFree willLibre albedrío34The philosophical debate concerning free will and determinism has continued unresolved for millennia, the outcome of which allegedly carries critical implications for whether and how people are held responsible for their actions. The law generally presumes the existence of some manner of free will and constructs the concept of responsibility on top of these foundations. Without entering directly into the philosophical debate, the present thesis adopts the opposing presumption that metaphysical free will is precluded by causal determinism and therefore does not exist. From this starting position, the question asked is how can people rationally be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe absent of metaphysically free decision-making? Part One of the thesis reviews an extensive body of empirical and theoretical research concerning decision-making in the human brain from the joint studies of neuroscience and psychology. The reasoning for this is twofold; on the one hand, and in very general terms, neuropsychology is broadly premised on the same presumptions of causal determinism which underpin the natural sciences – i.e., the physics of the macroscopic universe, chemistry, biology, and the biochemistry governing biological organisms. On the other hand, every action which results in criminal liability begins with a decision to act in the brain, whether occurring consciously or unconsciously. Part Two of the thesis subsequently takes conclusions and implications from the neuropsychology of decision-making and applies them to a critique of the legal concept of responsibility, focusing on the aspect of mens rea in particular. The thesis proposes replacing proof of subjective states of mind with proof of certain mental capacities that are necessary for responsibility – the capacities to exercise ordinary self-control, to recognise and respond to reason, and to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions. This approach is tested against leading jurisprudence to demonstrate its efficacy as a practical means of ascribing legal responsibility for criminal actions. Further implications are presented, such as replacing the notion of moral blame with that of unreasonable conduct as the theoretical underpinning to criminal liability, and denying any role for retributive theories of punishment. Finally, this capacity-based theory of responsibility is reintroduced into the wider philosophical debate between free will and determinism. Here, it is demonstrated how the theory provides a rational approach to holding people responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe and without any presumptions of, or reliance upon, metaphysical free will.El debate filosófico sobre el libre albedrío y el determinismo, pese a su larga tradición, dista mucho de estar resuelto. Este, sin embargo, tendría importantes consecuencias a la hora de determinar si y cómo las personas habrían de ser responsabilizadas por sus acciones. El Derecho presume con carácter general la existencia de una suerte de libre albedrío y construye sobre tal premisa su concepto legal de responsabilidad. Aunque sin ocuparme directamente del debate filosófico, la presente tesis adopta como punto de partida la presunción metafísica opuesta al libre albedrío, esto es, la determinista. A partir de aquí, la cuestión central es la siguiente: ¿cómo puede ser hecha responsable de forma racional una persona por sus acciones en un universo determinado en el que no existe una libertad metafísica para tomar decisiones? En la primera parte de la tesis se analiza la literatura empírica y teórica sobre los procesos de toma de decisiones en la mente humana con base en investigaciones neurocientíficas y psicológicas. De ahí se extraen las dos siguientes conclusiones. Por un lado, y en términos muy genéricos, la neuropsicología está ampliamente sustentada sobre las mismas presunciones del determinismo causal que subyacen a las ciencias naturales, por ejemplo, a la física del universo microscópico, la química, la biología o la bioquímica que regula los organismos biológicos. Por otro lado, toda acción penalmente responsable comienza con una decisión de actuación en el cerebro, ya sea consciente o inconsciente. En la segunda parte de la tesis se extraen las necesarias conclusiones e implicaciones de la neuropsicología de la toma de decisiones para una crítica al concepto legal de responsabilidad, en especial, al concepto tradicional de mens rea. En esta tesis se propone reemplazar la prueba de los estados mentales subjetivos por la prueba de unas ciertas capacidades mentales que son condición necesaria para la responsabilidad – las capacidades para ejercer un autocontrol ordinario, para reconocer y responder a una razón, así como para entender la naturaleza y las consecuencias de una acción. Este planteamiento es sometido a examen de la mano de la jurisprudencia más relevante a fin de demostrar su eficacia y sus consecuencias prácticas a la hora de adscribir responsabilidad penal. Asimismo, se presentan ulteriores implicaciones de este planteamiento, por ejemplo, la sustitución de la noción de reproche moral por la de conducta irrazonable, una nueva aproximación a los fundamentos teóricos de la responsabilidad penal, o el rechazo de cualquier teoría retributiva del castigo. Finalmente, la teoría de la responsabilidad basada en la noción de capacidad aquí defendida es reintroducida en el amplio debate filosófico sobre el libre albedrío y el determinismo. Con ello se logra demostrar cómo dicha teoría ofrece una aproximación racional a la responsabilización de las personas por sus acciones en un mundo determinado al margen de toda presunción metafísica librealbitrista.Programa de doctorat en DretUniversitat Pompeu FabraMoreso, Josep JoanNagel, RosemarieCoca Vila, IvóUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament de Dret202320232023info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion818 p.application/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10803/687734TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Redinstname:CBUC, CESCAInglésL'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:www.tdx.cat:10803/6877342026-06-14T12:46:07Z |
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15,198674 |