An Interpretation of Łukasiewicz’s 4-Valued Modal Logic
[EN] A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist (rt) and possibilist (pt) theses defin...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de León |
| Repositorio: | BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:buleria.unileon.es:10612/25746 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-015-9362-x https://hdl.handle.net/10612/25746 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Lógica Many-valued logics Modal logics 4-valued logics Łukasiewicz 4-valued modal logic Bivalent semantics 72 Filosofía |
| Resumo: | [EN] A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist (rt) and possibilist (pt) theses defined as follows: rt: the value (in a bivalent sense) of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument (that is, 'A is necessary' is true (false) iff A is true (false), etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in Łm4. |
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