Relaxing quality differentiation through capacity limitation: A note
We consider a duopoly stage game where an incumbent sells a high-quality product while enjoying an ample production capacity. We study the quality-capacity best response of an entrant, before price competition takes place. We partially characterize equilibrium prices and payoffs in the corresponding...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/24752 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24752 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Preus -- Fixació Pricing |
| Resumo: | We consider a duopoly stage game where an incumbent sells a high-quality product while enjoying an ample production capacity. We study the quality-capacity best response of an entrant, before price competition takes place. We partially characterize equilibrium prices and payoffs in the corresponding Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing games and show that the entrant tends to rely exclusively on capacity limitation in a subgame perfect equilibrium, thereby showing that vertical differentiation is not robust to Bertrand-Edgeworth competition |
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