Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism
This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2012 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:147292 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/147292 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Consciousness Philosophy of mind Qualia Reductionism Knowledge argument Conceivability argument Multiple realization Explanatory gap Relation between philosophy and neuroscience |
| Resumo: | This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety. |
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