The Value of Play and the Good Human Life
The dominant conception of play in philosophy of sport is that it is autotelic. This conception is the subject of important criticisms by Stephen Schmid and others. With these criticisms in mind, my paper seeks to move the discussion of play beyond the apparent dichotomy of autotelicity and instrume...
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia (UCAM) |
| Repository: | RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.ucam.edu:10952/6113 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10952/6113 https://doi.org/10.12800/ccd.v13i38.1067 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Aristotle Stephen Schmid Aristóteles Instrumentalidad Friendship Amistad Instrumentality Autotélico Virtue Autotelic Virtud |
| Summary: | The dominant conception of play in philosophy of sport is that it is autotelic. This conception is the subject of important criticisms by Stephen Schmid and others. With these criticisms in mind, my paper seeks to move the discussion of play beyond the apparent dichotomy of autotelicity and instrumentality. Drawing a para-llel to the role virtue and friendship have in a broadly construed (neo-)Aristotelian ethic, I argue that play is an important part of the good human life. Like virtue and friendship, play is chosen both for the sake of its importance to the good life and for its own sake. It is partly constitutive of the good life and thus chosen as part of and for the sake of the good life. At the same time, however, play is chosen for its own sake: for what it is distinct from any further ends it might bring about. Thus, play is not autotelic, but nor is it instrumental. Play should be considered, therefore, a constituent va-lue of the good human life. |
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