The paradox of testimonial injustice
We claim that there appears to be something paradoxical in the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. The awareness that testimonial injustice exists in a society seems to function as pro tanto epistemic evidence that might, in turn, offer the hearer some justification for perpetrating it. Although su...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Sevilla (US) |
| Repositório: | idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:idus.us.es:11441/178696 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/11441/178696 https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf071 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Epistemology of testimony Testimonial injustice Credibility Prejudice Epistemic oppression |
| Resumo: | We claim that there appears to be something paradoxical in the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. The awareness that testimonial injustice exists in a society seems to function as pro tanto epistemic evidence that might, in turn, offer the hearer some justification for perpetrating it. Although such justification may be extremely weak and easily outweighed by other epistemic, moral, or political considerations, the evidence itself is not something the hearer could rationally dismiss. Our aim in this paper is to present this as a challenge, rather than to resolve it: to set out the argument that gives rise to this apparent paradox, to show that it follows from existing frameworks of epistemic injustice, and to underline the lack of a readily apparent solution given the resources available. We argue against biting the bullet by highlighting its problematic consequences and conclude by encouraging future research that might truly defuse this paradox. |
|---|