Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity

We study groundwater management under a regime shock affecting water availability, using a dynamic common-property resource game. The different players correspond to different groundwater uses (irrigation or urban water supply), enabling us to consider competition between economic sectors for the st...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Frutos Cachorro, Julia de, Marín Solano, Jesús, Navas, Jorge
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/176488
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/176488
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Circulació d'aigües subterrànies
Escassetat
Teoria de jocs
Groundwater flow
Scarcity
Game theory
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spelling Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcityFrutos Cachorro, Julia deMarín Solano, JesúsNavas, JorgeCirculació d'aigües subterràniesEscassetatTeoria de jocsGroundwater flowScarcityGame theoryWe study groundwater management under a regime shock affecting water availability, using a dynamic common-property resource game. The different players correspond to different groundwater uses (irrigation or urban water supply), enabling us to consider competition between economic sectors for the stock with limited availability. The players have different water demand functions and, under certain circumstances depending on the shock, different discount rates. The effects of asymmetries in both demand and discount rates are analyzed, comparing cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. A numerical analysis for the particular case of the Western La Mancha aquifer in Spain is conducted to analyze the degree of inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions with respect to cooperative solutions in terms of welfare. We show that a higher asymmetry in discount rates reduces the inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions. The opposite result is obtained when considering the asymmetry in demand.Elsevier B.V.2021202320212021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/176488Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2020.100173Water Resources and Economics, 2021, vol. 33, num. 100173https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2020.100173cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2021http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1764882026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
title Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
spellingShingle Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
Frutos Cachorro, Julia de
Circulació d'aigües subterrànies
Escassetat
Teoria de jocs
Groundwater flow
Scarcity
Game theory
title_short Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
title_full Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
title_fullStr Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
title_full_unstemmed Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
title_sort Competition between different groundwater uses under water scarcity
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Frutos Cachorro, Julia de
Marín Solano, Jesús
Navas, Jorge
author Frutos Cachorro, Julia de
author_facet Frutos Cachorro, Julia de
Marín Solano, Jesús
Navas, Jorge
author_role author
author2 Marín Solano, Jesús
Navas, Jorge
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Circulació d'aigües subterrànies
Escassetat
Teoria de jocs
Groundwater flow
Scarcity
Game theory
topic Circulació d'aigües subterrànies
Escassetat
Teoria de jocs
Groundwater flow
Scarcity
Game theory
description We study groundwater management under a regime shock affecting water availability, using a dynamic common-property resource game. The different players correspond to different groundwater uses (irrigation or urban water supply), enabling us to consider competition between economic sectors for the stock with limited availability. The players have different water demand functions and, under certain circumstances depending on the shock, different discount rates. The effects of asymmetries in both demand and discount rates are analyzed, comparing cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. A numerical analysis for the particular case of the Western La Mancha aquifer in Spain is conducted to analyze the degree of inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions with respect to cooperative solutions in terms of welfare. We show that a higher asymmetry in discount rates reduces the inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions. The opposite result is obtained when considering the asymmetry in demand.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021
2021
2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/176488
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/176488
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2020.100173
Water Resources and Economics, 2021, vol. 33, num. 100173
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2020.100173
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2021
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2021
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,228081

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