Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price

The location-price decision problem for competing firms can be reduced to a loca- tion game if firms compete on delivered pricing. This game has often been studied for non-cooperative firms where the Nash equilibrium is used as solution concept. However, it may occurs that there exist alternative lo...

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Autores: Pelegrín, Blas, Fernández, Pascual, García, María Dolores
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia (UCAM)
Repositorio:RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ucam.edu:10952/10782
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10952/10782
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Facility location
Joint profit
Network optimization
Spatial competition
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spelling Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in PricePelegrín, BlasFernández, PascualGarcía, María DoloresFacility locationJoint profitNetwork optimizationSpatial competitionThe location-price decision problem for competing firms can be reduced to a loca- tion game if firms compete on delivered pricing. This game has often been studied for non-cooperative firms where the Nash equilibrium is used as solution concept. However, it may occurs that there exist alternative locations for which all firms get higher payoffs than those prescribed by the equilibrium. This fact has been shown by the authors for joint profit maximization locations when demand is fixed and firms set equilibrium prices. In this paper, we study the location game considering that demand is linear in price and firms cooperate by setting the monopoly price at each market instead of the equilibrium price. Two Mixed Integer Linear Programming location models are developed to maximize the joint profit for different and equal production costs, respectively. An empirical investigation is performed to compare the joint profit of the firms, which is obtained by the solutions of the proposed loca- tion models, with the one obtained by the Nash equilibrium solution that is obtained if the firms do not cooperate.Administración y Dirección de EmpresasEscuela Politécnica2025info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10952/10782reponame:RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murciainstname:Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia (UCAM)Inglésinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ucam.edu:10952/107822026-06-07T18:35:21Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
title Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
spellingShingle Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
Pelegrín, Blas
Facility location
Joint profit
Network optimization
Spatial competition
title_short Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
title_full Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
title_fullStr Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
title_full_unstemmed Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
title_sort Cooperative Location for Competing Firms under Delivered Pricing and Demand Linear in Price
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pelegrín, Blas
Fernández, Pascual
García, María Dolores
author Pelegrín, Blas
author_facet Pelegrín, Blas
Fernández, Pascual
García, María Dolores
author_role author
author2 Fernández, Pascual
García, María Dolores
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Facility location
Joint profit
Network optimization
Spatial competition
topic Facility location
Joint profit
Network optimization
Spatial competition
description The location-price decision problem for competing firms can be reduced to a loca- tion game if firms compete on delivered pricing. This game has often been studied for non-cooperative firms where the Nash equilibrium is used as solution concept. However, it may occurs that there exist alternative locations for which all firms get higher payoffs than those prescribed by the equilibrium. This fact has been shown by the authors for joint profit maximization locations when demand is fixed and firms set equilibrium prices. In this paper, we study the location game considering that demand is linear in price and firms cooperate by setting the monopoly price at each market instead of the equilibrium price. Two Mixed Integer Linear Programming location models are developed to maximize the joint profit for different and equal production costs, respectively. An empirical investigation is performed to compare the joint profit of the firms, which is obtained by the solutions of the proposed loca- tion models, with the one obtained by the Nash equilibrium solution that is obtained if the firms do not cooperate.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10952/10782
url http://hdl.handle.net/10952/10782
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia
instname:Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia (UCAM)
instname_str Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia (UCAM)
reponame_str RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia
collection RIUCAM. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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