Lies we don’t say: Figurative language, commitment, and deniability

A theory of lies should be able to explain, first, what makes lies special among the variety of deceptive uses of language and, second, why we don't consider figurative speakers to be lying even if they seem to be putting forward something they believe to be false. Here I contend that a commitm...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Garmendia Mugica, Joana
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Universidad del País Vasco
Repositorio:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
OAI Identifier:oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/65599
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10810/65599
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Lies, commitment, Grice, irony, implicature, deniability
Descripción
Sumario:A theory of lies should be able to explain, first, what makes lies special among the variety of deceptive uses of language and, second, why we don't consider figurative speakers to be lying even if they seem to be putting forward something they believe to be false. Here I contend that a commitment-based account can meet both aims without compromising with a too narrow conception of lies. The result is an approach that can accommodate the irregular results of experimental analysis, and that answers to the challenge posed by insincere implicatures in general, and lies via figurative language in particular.