Partial cooperation and convex sets

We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made up of coalition systems, in which every unit coalition is feasible and every coalition of players can be expressed as a disjoint union of maximal feasible coalitions. These systems are named partitio...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Romero García, J. Enrique|||0000-0002-4827-3492, López, Jorge J.
Format: article
Publication Date:2003
Country:España
Institution:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repository:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Language:English
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:93737
Online Access:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/93737
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Cooperative games
Partial cooperation
Convex sets
Description
Summary:We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made up of coalition systems, in which every unit coalition is feasible and every coalition of players can be expressed as a disjoint union of maximal feasible coalitions. These systems are named partition systems and cause restricted games. To sum up, we study feasible coalition systems defined by a partial order designed for a set of players and we analyze the characteristics of a feasible coalition system developed from a family of convex sets.