Decomposition and arrow-like aggregation of fuzzy preferences
We analyze the concept of a fuzzy preference on a set of alternatives, and how it can be decomposed in a triplet of new fuzzy binary relations that represent strict preference, weak preference and indifference. In this setting, we analyze the problem of aggregation of individual fuzzy preferences in...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/37331 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/37331 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Arrow’s impossibility theorems Mathematical social choice Fuzzy preferences Decomposition of preferences Aggregation of individual profiles Social rules Arrovian models, Paretian property Independence of irrelevant alternatives Dictatorship |
| Sumario: | We analyze the concept of a fuzzy preference on a set of alternatives, and how it can be decomposed in a triplet of new fuzzy binary relations that represent strict preference, weak preference and indifference. In this setting, we analyze the problem of aggregation of individual fuzzy preferences in a society into a global one that represents the whole society and accomplishes a shortlist of common-sense properties in the spirit of the Arrovian model for crisp preferences. We introduce a new technique that allows us to control a fuzzy preference by means of five crisp binary relations. This leads to an Arrovian impossibility theorem in this particular fuzzy setting. |
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