Board of Directors’ Remuneration, Employee Costs, and Layoffs: Evidence from Spain
Most of the empirical studies on board remuneration have focused on finding explanatory performance measures. There are studies that analyze if the compensation contracts of directors reward managers in such a way that they strive to maximize firm performance and shareholders’ wealth; however, there...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | e-spacio. Repositorio Institucional de la UNED |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:e-spacio.uned.es:20.500.14468/11894 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/11894 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | firm performance board remuneration layoffs personnel management |
| Resumo: | Most of the empirical studies on board remuneration have focused on finding explanatory performance measures. There are studies that analyze if the compensation contracts of directors reward managers in such a way that they strive to maximize firm performance and shareholders’ wealth; however, there are few studies on the social aspect of corporate governance, or agent–employee and principal–employee relationships. Thus, in this study, our aim is to test whether there is a causal relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors of listed companies and the personnel policies of the companies, expressed through the cost of personnel and layoffs. For that, we used a sample of Spanish listed companies, and we found that two performance measures (return on equity and earnings per share on market price) have a greater effect on the growth rate of board remuneration when layoffs occur. Additionally, we found that the sales revenue and cash flow on total assets subsequently influenced personnel management. |
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