Revisiting “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”
In this paper, I revisit themes from my paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?” I begin by discussing our connection to the proper names that we use, and I explain why I continue to think that the epistemic status of true name-containing identity sentences is not puzzling. I conclude with some remark...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | Costa Rica |
| Institución: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21313 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21313 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | frege’s puzzle proper names reference saul kripke david kaplan puzzle de frege nombres propios referencia |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I revisit themes from my paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?” I begin by discussing our connection to the proper names that we use, and I explain why I continue to think that the epistemic status of true name-containing identity sentences is not puzzling. I conclude with some remarks about why I think that adherents of the direct reference conception of names should accept this position. |
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