ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM

I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:Brasil
Institución:Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)
Repositorio:Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.ufpel:article/21673
Acceso en línea:https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Normative realism
moral realism
non-naturalism
persons
coincidence.
Realismo normativo
realismo moral
não-naturalismo
pessoas
coincidência.
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spelling ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEMNormative realismmoral realismnon-naturalismpersonscoincidence.Realismo normativorealismo moralnão-naturalismopessoascoincidência. I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, the result is that there is a remarkable coincidence between the content of normative facts and the kind of beings that actually exist. On the one hand, the normative facts single out persons as anespecially relevant kind of being and, on the other hand, persons happen to exist. This match amounts to a coincidence because, according to robust ethical realism, normative facts cannot explain why there are persons and the fact that there are persons cannot explain why the normative facts are what they are. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. Although there are important similarities between this objection and other objections to normative realism that appeal to remarkable coincidences (such as Street’s evolutionary debunking argument and Bedke’s cosmic coincidence argument), I argue that the moral coincidence poses a different problem for robust ethical realism. Eu apresento uma objeção do realismo ético robusto – a tese de que há fatos morais independentes de nós e dotados de relevância normativa. Argumento que se combinamos o realismo ético robusto com uma concepção tradicional da moralidade, segundo a qual pessoas são especialmente importantes do ponto de vista moral, o resultado é uma coincidência extraordinária entre o conteúdo de fatos normativos e o tipo se ser que de fato existe. De um lado, os fatos normativos destacam pessoas como um tipo de ser especialmente importante e, por outro lado, acontece de pessoas existirem. Essa correspondência é uma coincidência porque, de acordo com o realismo ético robusto, fatos normativos não podem explicar porque há pessoas e o fato de que há pessoas não pode explicar porque os fatos normativos são o que são. Na medida em que compromisso com coincidências inexplicáveis conta contra uma tese, o realismo ético robusto enfrenta um problema. Embora existem semelhanças importantes entre essa objeção e outras objeções ao realismo normativo que também apelam a coincidências extraordinárias (como o argumento evolucionário de Street e o argumento da coincidência cósmica de Bedke), argumento que a coincidência moral representa um problema diferente para o realismo ético robusto.Universidade Federal de Pelotas2022-08-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/2167310.15210/dissertatio.v55i0.21673Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia; v. 55 (2022); 91-110Dissertatio’s Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 55 (2022); 91-1101983-889110.15210/dissertatio.v55i0reponame:Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)instacron:UFPELenghttps://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673/14569Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Dissertatio de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVogelmann, Rafael Graebin2025-03-27T11:43:30Zoai:ojs.ufpel:article/21673Revistahttps://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/oairevista.dissertatio@ufpel.edu.br || seer@ufpel.edu.br || joao.hobuss@ufpel.edu.br || luiseduardorubira@gmail.com1983-88911413-9448opendoar:2025-03-27T11:43:30Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
title ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
spellingShingle ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin
Normative realism
moral realism
non-naturalism
persons
coincidence.
Realismo normativo
realismo moral
não-naturalismo
pessoas
coincidência.
title_short ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
title_full ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
title_fullStr ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
title_full_unstemmed ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
title_sort ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin
author Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin
author_facet Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin
author_role author
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Normative realism
moral realism
non-naturalism
persons
coincidence.
Realismo normativo
realismo moral
não-naturalismo
pessoas
coincidência.
topic Normative realism
moral realism
non-naturalism
persons
coincidence.
Realismo normativo
realismo moral
não-naturalismo
pessoas
coincidência.
description I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, the result is that there is a remarkable coincidence between the content of normative facts and the kind of beings that actually exist. On the one hand, the normative facts single out persons as anespecially relevant kind of being and, on the other hand, persons happen to exist. This match amounts to a coincidence because, according to robust ethical realism, normative facts cannot explain why there are persons and the fact that there are persons cannot explain why the normative facts are what they are. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. Although there are important similarities between this objection and other objections to normative realism that appeal to remarkable coincidences (such as Street’s evolutionary debunking argument and Bedke’s cosmic coincidence argument), I argue that the moral coincidence poses a different problem for robust ethical realism. 
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-08-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673
10.15210/dissertatio.v55i0.21673
url https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673
identifier_str_mv 10.15210/dissertatio.v55i0.21673
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673/14569
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pelotas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pelotas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia; v. 55 (2022); 91-110
Dissertatio’s Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 55 (2022); 91-110
1983-8891
10.15210/dissertatio.v55i0
reponame:Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)
instacron:UFPEL
instname_str Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)
instacron_str UFPEL
institution UFPEL
reponame_str Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online)
collection Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revista.dissertatio@ufpel.edu.br || seer@ufpel.edu.br || joao.hobuss@ufpel.edu.br || luiseduardorubira@gmail.com
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score 15,301629

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