The Problem of Free Will and The (Im)Possibility of Philosophical Progress
The purpose of this article is to analyze John Searle's assertion that the traditional problem of free will is a philosophical scandal because it does not demonstrate relevant progress. Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image of the human being is p...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositório: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | português |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/259873 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/259873 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | John Searle Daniel Dennett free will progress in philosophy compatibilism livre-arbítrio progresso em filosofia compatibilismo |
| Resumo: | The purpose of this article is to analyze John Searle's assertion that the traditional problem of free will is a philosophical scandal because it does not demonstrate relevant progress. Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image of the human being is presented to provide context to the traditional philosophical problem of free will. The possibility of progress in philosophy is briefly discussed to assess whether the problem of free will is at a disadvantage compared to other philosophical issues. Finally, Daniel Dennett's compatibilism is proposed as a response to Searle. Free will, as understood through Dennett's evolutionary perspective, represents a form of progress in the philosophical endeavor to reconcile the manifest image and the scientific image. |
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