Experimentos mentais como argumentos: objeções à abordagem de Norton
It is usually supposed that mental experiments are imaginary devices that allow us to acquire beliefs that constitute knowledge. John D. Norton has presented an influential approach to explain how scientific mental experiments can produce new knowledge about the world. He claims that there is nothin...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/247942 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/247942 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Norton mental experiments knowledge justification arguments inference. experimentos mentais conhecimento justificação argumentos inferência |
| Sumario: | It is usually supposed that mental experiments are imaginary devices that allow us to acquire beliefs that constitute knowledge. John D. Norton has presented an influential approach to explain how scientific mental experiments can produce new knowledge about the world. He claims that there is nothing distinctive about mental experiments, based on his claim that they work exactly like arguments. In this paper, we challenge his approach. We examine essential aspects of his approach that involve the notions of “argument” and “inference” in order to show that a subject who comes to knows something through running or conducting a mental experiment hardly is considered as having effectively ran an argument or an inferential reasoning process. |
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