TRUE PEJORATIVE SENTENCES BEYOND THE EXISTENTIAL CORE: ON SOME UNWELCOME IMPLICATIONS OF HOM AND MAY’S THEORY
This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whet...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
| Repositorio: | Kriterion (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/36247 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/36247 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Pejoratives slurs moral and semantic innocence derogation offensiveness Pejorativos Injúrias Inocência Moral e Semântica Derrogação Ofensividade |
| Sumario: | This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whether they are compatible with the view advocated by them (so-called Moral and Semantic Innocence) remains open. Helping ourselves to the standard model-theoretical framework Hom and May (presumably) work in, we prove they are compatible with the view. Given that the issues of both the moral import of pejoratives and the practical effects of their utterance are not settled by the proof, we then highlight unwelcome moral and pragmatic implications for some of the pejorative sentences under scrutiny; thereby showing that the view, broadly understood, is not as morally and semantically innocuous as it is meant to be. |
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